A series of defections and mergers has raised fresh questions about the effectiveness of India's anti-defection law. The law has been used to aid defections rather than prevent them.
Incorporated into the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in the 1980s, the anti-defection law was crucial for upholding democratic principles. It was meant to ensure political stability and guard against opportunistic defections that undermined the electoral mandate.
However, the law has failed to achieve its objectives, and defections have become a destabilizing force in opposition parties. The recent trend of breaking away from parties with two-thirds of lawmakers is a clear attempt to avoid action under the anti-defection law.
Some innovative ways have been adopted to circumvent the law, including asking defecting lawmakers to resign, leading to the fall of a government, and then contesting on the tickets of the ruling party and winning.
The presiding officers have been slow in deciding disqualification petitions, sometimes until the end of assembly terms. There have been instances of dissenting lawmakers being disqualified for defying the party whip within a month or two of the next election.
An overhaul of the anti-defection law is the need of the hour to prevent defections. A provision that a defector cannot contest any election for six years, similar to the provision for lawmakers convicted of crimes with three or more years of imprisonment, is essential.
A timeline has to be there for the Constitutional courts to decide on petitions against the orders of speakers. For the period a Speaker is hearing a petition, the lawmaker in question should not be allowed to participate in legislative business and get any salary or allowances. A criminal action should be initiated against the lawmaker for cheating with the people's verdict if disqualified.
